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Abstract
The understanding of emotions based on counterfactual reasoning was studied in children with 
high-functioning autism spectrum disorders (n = 71) and in typically developing children (n = 
71), aged 6–12 years. Children were presented with eight stories about two protagonists who 
experienced the same positive or negative outcome, either due to their own action or by default. 
Relative to the comparison group, children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder were 
poor at explaining emotions based on downward counterfactual reasoning (i.e. contentment and 
relief). There were no group differences in upward counterfactual reasoning (i.e. disappointment 
and regret). In the comparison group, second-order false-belief reasoning was related to children’s 
understanding of second-order counterfactual emotions (i.e. regret and relief), while children in 
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the high-functioning autism spectrum disorder group relied more on their general intellectual 
skills. Results are discussed in terms of the different functions of counterfactual reasoning about 
emotion and the cognitive style of children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder.
Keywords
autism, counterfactual, downward, emotion, regret, relief, upward
Counterfactual reasoning involves imagining alternatives to one or more features of a perceived 
event (Epstude and Roese, 2008) and switching back and forth between a real situation and an 
imagined (counterfactual) one. Counterfactual reasoning is a pervasive psychological capacity 
influencing many domains of thinking and functioning (Roese, 1997). In recent years, the study of 
children’s emotional understanding has moved into the domain of counterfactual reasoning. It has 
become clear that despite early appearing utilization of counterfactual thinking in preschool chil-
dren (see Harris, 2000, but also see Beck and Guthrie, 2011, for a discussion), it is not until about 
7 years of age that children reliably appreciate the emotional consequences stemming from the 
reflection on counterfactual possibilities. Such emotions serve various adaptive functions. They 
prepare us to be more cautious in future situations (e.g. “If only I had taken a different turn, I 
wouldn’t have been caught in this traffic jam”), but also help to regulate current emotional states 
(e.g. “At least I wasn’t in the accident [causing the traffic jam]”) and are critical to properly under-
stand people’s complex, but nonetheless ordinary, emotional responses to events (Roese, 1997). 
Understanding these complex emotional sensitivities is likely to be difficult for children with 
autism, even when they show normal intelligence (see Begeer et al., 2008, for a review). In the 
present study, we investigate the understanding of emotions based on counterfactual reasoning in 
children with typical development or autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), highlighting the different 
functions of such counterfactually based emotions (CF-emotions) and the capacities that are needed 
to appreciate these functions.
There are a number of distinctions that are helpful in the analysis of emotions based on coun-
terfactual thinking (Roese, 1997). First, an important difference has been made in the literature 
between upward and downward counterfactual reasonings. Upward counterfactual reasoning 
involves comparing a current situation with a better alternative and is typically, although not 
exclusively, elicited by a negative situation. This type of reasoning serves an important prepara-
tive function. Comparing a situation with a better alternative provides an incentive to improve our 
future condition and thus modify our behavior (Roese, 1997). In the emotional domain, considering 
how things could have turned out more favorably generally elicits the feelings of disappointment, 
or even regret when we feel a high degree of responsibility (high agency) for the chosen course 
of action (Zeelenberg et al., 1998). Upward counterfactual reasoning has been related to problem-
focused coping strategies, attaining control over negative events, and planning (White and 
Lehman, 2005), which can inspire us to “do better” next time. In Table 1, we schematically depict 
the simple features of downward and upward counterfactual thinking, illustrating relationships 
with outcome valence and agency.
Downward counterfactual reasoning involves comparing our current situation to a worse alterna-
tive, “looking on the bright side of life” (White and Lehman, 2005). While upward counterfactual 
reasoning is often used to improve future outcomes, downward counterfactuals are often used to 
improve how we feel about our current circumstances. Reflecting on how things might have turned 
out worse may induce contentment, or relief when we feel a high degree of responsibility (high 
agency) for preventing the negative situation (Guttentag and Ferrell, 2004). Compared with upward 
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counterfactuals and the feeling of regret, the use of downward counterfactuals and the feeling of 
relief are not so clearly related to future action. Rather, these latter psychological responses provide 
a means of dealing with the current situation, which has been related to emotion-focused coping 
strategies (White and Lehman, 2005), and better quality of life (Bauer and Wrosch, 2011).
While the embedded structure of downward and upward counterfactuals is similar, the adap-
tive role of upward counterfactual reasoning, and its commonly related emotion of regret, has 
been emphasized more in the literature than downward counterfactual reasoning and relief (White 
and Lehman, 2005). The fear of regret has a pervasive impact on decision-making (Gilbert et al., 
2004). Adults (e.g. Sanna and Turley, 1996) and children (German, 1999) use upward compari-
sons more frequently than downward comparisons, which may be due to the strong impetus for 
using counterfactual thinking in negative situations (Harris, 2000).
A second distinction that is useful for understanding emotions caused by counterfactual 
reasoning, which has been alluded to earlier, is the extent to which an individual feels a sense 
of agency in bringing about a situation or outcome. When someone is presented with an out-
come for which there is little feeling of personal responsibility, but there is nonetheless a basis 
to imagine how the situation may have unfolded differently (e.g. an alternative situation is 
nearly experienced; a “near miss”), this may elicit simple emotional responses based on coun-
terfactual reasoning, like contentment or disappointment. However, when someone feels more 
responsibility for bringing about an outcome, second-order emotions based on counterfactual 
reasoning become more common, such as regret and relief. Second-order emotions (some-
times also referred to as complex or self-conscious emotions) are those emotions that normally 
depend on a psychological appraisal of another person. Thus, second-order emotions, which 
include pride, jealousy, and embarrassment, cannot be understood merely in terms of an indi-
vidual’s current first-order mental attitudes (i.e. thoughts, beliefs, and preferences) or situa-
tional determinants. Instead, second-order emotions require a contrasting psychological 
appraisal, attribution, or perspective. Second-order emotions are generally understood later in 
typically developing children, while the understanding of such emotions in children with ASD 
is relatively poor (Begeer et al., 2008).
Regret and relief may be particularly difficult to understand because they involve second-order, 
contrasting psychological appraisals as described earlier, but these are imaginations of oneself at 
another time and thus require counterfactual reasoning. For example, in the case of regret, an out-
come (i.e. being stuck in traffic) and a protagonist’s wishes/preferences (i.e. to be at work in time) 
need to be integrated with the intentions that underpinned the protagonist’s decision at an earlier 
Table 1. Schematic outline of main components related to upward and downward counterfactual thinking
Downward counterfactual Upward counterfactual
Comparing current situation to Worse alternative Better alternative
Main function Affective, improving current 
emotional state
Preparative, improving the future
Related coping strategies Emotion focused Problem focused
Related emotion if caused by 
“near miss” (low agency)
Contentment Disappointment
Related emotion if caused by 
own action (high agency)
Relief Regret
Usage in daily life Less frequent More frequent
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time (i.e. choosing a particular route to get to work). During this process, one needs to appreciate 
the embedded nature of the protagonist’s thoughts about how an alternative prior decision may 
have resulted in different outcomes. In the traffic example, a feeling of regret emerges when the 
protagonist infers events that unfold from imagining a “false” premise (e.g. having taken the right 
turn instead). When the counterfactual outcome (i.e. being on time) is inferred from the “false” 
premise, the resulting emotional response is positive (or neutral) and contrasts sharply with the 
frustration of being stuck in traffic. This contrast between two possible emotional outcomes 
requires second-order Theory of Mind. It is irrelevant that the protagonist is reflecting on his or her 
own mental states. Theory of Mind usually refers to inferring someone else’s state of mind, but 
could just as well be directed at inferring one’s own state of mind at other (imagined) times or 
contexts (Baron-Cohen et al., 2007). Thus, to make an emotion attribution such as regret or relief, 
the child needs to understand the role of the protagonist’s reflection on his or her earlier intentions 
and decisions, which might have gone a different way and brought about a different emotional 
outcome. Simple emotional responses like contentment or disappointment can be inferred from the 
match between a person’s wishes and the (positive or negative) outcome and do not require recur-
sive inference.
In typical development, the first signs of counterfactual reasoning are seen during preschool. 
Two-year-olds already show some form of counterfactual understanding (Harris, 2000). For 
example, when a toy horse gallops toward the edge of a table and stops just in time, they can 
understand what “almost” or “nearly” happened (i.e. the toy horse falling off the table). By 4 or 
5 years of age, children produce well-formed counterfactuals themselves (Beck et al., 2006). The 
ability to reason about counterfactuals has been linked to the acknowledgement of representa-
tional mental states in others, their Theory of Mind, which also occurs at about 4 years of age 
when children’s folk psychological explanations start to explicitly refer to (false) beliefs (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2007). The rationale here is that in order to be able to acknowledge the content of 
other people’s mental states, or one’s own mental states at a previous time, the reality of one’s 
current mental states needs to be inhibited. This ability to disengage or suspend current knowl-
edge can be considered a special form of counterfactual thinking (Riggs et al., 1998). While 
counterfactual reasoning emerges earlier than false-belief (FB) reasoning (Perner et al., 2004), 
both require children to understand that propositions may refer to entities (events and locations) 
that differ from current reality (Guajardo and Turley-Ames, 2004; Mueller et al., 2007).
In the emotional domain, there is some evidence that children as young as 5 years of age can 
acknowledge regret, not relief, in themselves (Weisberg and Beck, 2010), but they have consider-
ably more difficulty explaining disappointment, regret, and relief in other people even at 7 years of 
age (Ferrell et al., 2009; Guttentag and Ferrell, 2004, 2008; Weisberg and Beck, 2010). At present, 
it is not clear whether children master simple emotions based on counterfactual reasoning (e.g. 
disappointment and contentment) before second-order emotions (e.g. regret and relief). From the 
point of view of Theory of Mind development, however, second-order emotions based on counter-
factual reasoning should present a greater challenge for children because of the need to embed the 
imagined counterfactual possibility within an earlier psychological stance (i.e. previous intentions 
and decision).
While studies on the experience second-order emotions in autism are relatively scarce (but see 
Bauminger, 2004), children with ASD have repeatedly been shown to have limitations in their 
understanding of social or second-order emotions that are elicited by mental representations of 
reality or involve appraising one’s self through the (imagined) evaluations of others. Thus, children 
with ASD show some difficulties in understanding surprise, shame, embarrassment, pride, and 
jealousy. Furthermore, such limitations have been consistently associated with broader deficits in 
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mental state reasoning (i.e. Theory of Mind; see Begeer et al., 2008). In keeping with this overall 
pattern, positive associations between Theory of Mind and counterfactual reasoning have also been 
documented in both typically developing (Guajardo and Turley-Ames, 2004) and ASD (Grant 
et al., 2004) children. Currently, however, it is not clear whether relations between Theory of Mind 
and understanding emotions based on counterfactual reasoning only entail for second-order 
emotions, or whether such relations are also found with simple emotions.
It is also unclear whether there is a systematic difference in children’s understanding of upward 
(imagining a better outcome) and downward (imagining a worse outcome) counterfactuals in the 
context of reasoning about emotional outcomes. Of relevance to this distinction, Guttentag and 
Ferrell (2004) showed that 7-year-old children more readily recognized regret (upward) in a negative 
situation than relief (downward) in a positive or neutral situation. Furthermore, Guttentag and Ferrell 
(2008) report that in the context of a negative outcome, 7-year-olds and 8-year-olds could express 
regret and disappointment (utilizing upward counterfactuals), but there were few instances of down-
ward counterfactual use (i.e. “things could have been worse”) until 9 years of age. Such findings are 
in line with the adult literature, in which counterfactual reasoning is more commonly utilized when 
outcomes are negative (Beck and Crilly, 2009; Roese, 1997; Weisberg and Beck, 2010), and negative 
situations more strongly afford upward counterfactual reasoning (White and Lehman, 2005).
Interestingly, children with ASDs have been found to be quite skilled at reasoning about 
counterfactual realities. When asked to generate an outcome based on an explicitly presented 
counterfactual statement (e.g. I have a story where all cows go “Quack.” Freda is a cow. In my 
story, does Freda say “Quack”?), intellectually disabled (ID) individuals with ASD were equally 
able as controls to generate the correct consequence (i.e. Yes, Freda says “Quack”), despite its 
stark contrast with reality (Leevers and Harris, 2000; Peterson and Bowler, 2000; Scott and 
Baron-Cohen, 1996). However, in these tasks, the correct answer could be inferred deductively 
from the premises. In contrast, when presented with stories and given open-ended questions, for 
which the correct answer cannot be deduced from the premises, children with ASD and ID are 
less able to generate novel alternative resolutions (Grant et al., 2004). It is tempting to conclude, 
therefore, that children with autism are capable with counterfactual reasoning so long as they do 
not have to speculate, imaginatively, on possible alternative outcomes that are not implied in a 
given scenario. However, when open-ended questions were given to 6–12-year-old normally 
intelligent children with ASD (high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (HFASD)), their abil-
ity to generate counterfactuals was on par with typically developing children (Begeer et al., 
2009). On the basis of the extant literature, it is not known whether HFASD children are attuned 
to the affective consequences of comparing factual and counterfactual realities. Indeed, it is 
plausible that they do not experience difficulties reasoning from counterfactual premises per se, 
so it is important to establish how they use such capacities to understand others.
When reasoning about CF-emotion, there may be specific situational characteristics that dif-
ferentiate HFASD and typically developing children, in particular when the domains of direction 
(upward versus downward) and agency (high versus low) are considered. First, it could be argued 
that children with HFASD, who are able to understand the situational components of emotions 
(Begeer et al., 2008), and can generate counterfactual alternatives to reality (Begeer et al., 2009), 
should be able to reflect on the counterfactual basis of simple emotions like disappointment and 
contentment. However, their widely described limitations with Theory of Mind and second-order 
emotion attributions would hypothetically impair their understanding of the counterfactual basis of 
second-order emotions like regret and relief, which requires the child to conceptualize the protago-
nist reflecting on the motivations and intentions that constituted his or her previous decision 
(Zeelenberg et al., 1998).
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Furthermore, the nuanced functional features of downward CF-emotions may be less compel-
ling to children with HFASD when compared to typically developing children. Upward compari-
sons are generally more common than downward counterfactuals (White and Lehman, 2005). They 
are usually triggered by negative situations (“if only ...”), which directly entail the modification of 
one’s actions or circumstances in the future. This pragmatic, preparative function of upward coun-
terfactual reasoning stands in contrast to the less pragmatic role of downward counterfactuals 
(“things could have been worse”), which primarily provide a mechanism for dealing with the cur-
rent situation by modifying one’s perspective. Generally speaking, the impetus to modify a positive 
outcome is not as compelling as the impetus to modify a negative outcome, which is likely the 
main reason for the lower prevalence of downward counterfactuals (Harris, 2000). Children with 
HFASD, who are usually less focused on internal psychological processes, may be less apprecia-
tive of these internal psychological mechanisms that are not related to clear outcomes (Lombardo 
et al., 2007).
In the present study, we focused on the understanding of CF-emotions in children with and 
without HFASD (6–12 years old). Following Guttentag and Ferrell (2004, 2008), we described 
two protagonists who experienced identical outcomes, with stories that have been previously used 
in the literature where possible. For one (target) protagonist, a counterfactual alternative was 
available that would have resulted in a different outcome. Depending on whether the story pro-
tagonists were responsible for the outcomes, the stories elicited simple or second-order emotions. 
In addition, depending on the positive or negative nature of the outcome, the stories were intended 
to elicit downward or upward counterfactual reasoning, respectively, as has been previously 
documented in the literature (Roese, 1997). In all stories, children were asked to judge whether 
one protagonist would feel “better,” “worse,” or “the same” about the outcome compared to the 
other protagonist, and explain why.
In line with the general literature, we expected that there would be an age-related improve-
ment across the CF-emotion tasks. Based on their adequate understanding of counterfactual 
outcomes and situational causes of emotions, we expected children with HFASD to perform at 
similar levels to typically developing comparison children in the simple counterfactual emotion 
tasks. However, based on their documented limitations in second-order reasoning, we expected 
children with HFASD to show limitations in their explanations of second-order counterfactual 
emotions. Furthermore, we explored the role of negative outcomes, which are likely to provide 
different triggers for counterfactual reasoning in children with and without HFASD. Specifically, 
we predicted that HFASD children would be less likely to employ downward counterfactuals 
than typically developing children. Finally, the role of second-order Theory of Mind understand-
ing in the explanation of CF-emotions was explored in children with HFASD and typically 
developing children separately.
Method
Participants
The participants were 71 children with HFASD (64 boys and 7 girls), and 71 typically developing 
children (67 boys and 4 girls), aged 6–12 years. Active parental consent was obtained for all the 
participating children. The HFASD group included 45 children with pervasive developmental 
disorder—not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS) and 26 children with Asperger’s syndrome. The 
diagnostic classification of the children with HFASD was established by a team of clinicians 
working independently of the authors and blind to the outcomes of the current study. The 
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diagnostic assessment procedures were according to the established Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed., text revision (DSM-IV-TR) criteria (American Psychiatric 
Association (APA), 2000) of expert clinical judgment, involving multiple experienced clinicians, 
including child psychiatrists, psychologists, and educationalists. The diagnostic process included 
anamneses and examinations of psychiatric, neuropsychological, and logopedic functioning. 
None of the high-functioning autistic children had codiagnoses of additional disabilities (e.g. 
intellectual disability and deafness). Groups were similar in racial and ethnic compositions. The 
autistic group was 95% Caucasian, 1% Asian, and 4% African. Participants in the comparison 
group were also mostly Caucasian (91%), Asian (3%), and African (6%). Children were primar-
ily from middle-class and upper-middle-class families. All children came from families whose 
sole, or first, language was Dutch.
Because this research involved a language-based task, groups were matched as closely as pos-
sible on the basis of their full-scale intelligence quotient (IQ) as well as gender and chronological 
age (Table 2). Intelligence measures were obtained in a separate session, through administration of 
the Dutch version of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children III (WISC-III; Kort et al., 2002). 
There were no significant group differences in chronological age, full-scale IQ, or gender ratio.
Materials
CF-emotion tasks. Eight stories were used, two for each CF-emotion type, derived from Guttentag 
and Ferrell (2004, 2008) (see also Beck and Crilly, 2009). All scenarios involved two protagonists 
who experienced the same outcome (i.e. both either achieve or do not achieve what they desire). 
For the target protagonist, a counterfactual alternative was available that would have resulted in a 
better (upward) or worse (downward) outcome. In the simple stories, emotions were elicited by 
highlighting that the target protagonist nearly attained a positive or negative outcome. The near 
attainment of the outcome was intended to elicit disappointment (when a positive outcome was 
avoided) or contentment (when a negative outcome was avoided). In the second-order emotion 
stories, a target protagonist always made an active decision that led to the avoidance of a positive 
or negative outcome. This was intended to elicit regret or relief. At the end of each story, children 
were reminded of the outcome and of the critical element of the story that differentiated the two 
protagonists. Following this, children were asked whether one protagonist would feel “better,” 
“worse,” or “the same” about the outcome compared to the other protagonist and explain why (see 
Appendix 1 for examples).
Table 2. Participant age (years; months) and full-scale IQ
Chronological age Full-scale IQ
 M SD Range M SD Range
6–8 years Comparison (n = 24) 7;5 0;5 6;5–8;1 100.0 13.4 79–128
 HFASD (n = 21) 7;2 0;6 6;1–8;0 97.4 12.4 75–117
8–10 years Comparison (n = 21) 8;9 0;5 8;2–9;9 102.4 11.7 78–121
 HFASD (n = 21) 8;9 0;5 8;1–9;9 107.0 14.2 84–145
10–12 years Comparison (n = 26) 11;2 0;7 10;1–12;2 108.9 16.9 70–139
 HFASD (n = 29) 11;0 0;8 10;1–12;8 104.0 15.9 78–138
IQ: intelligence quotient; SD: standard deviation.
 at University of Sydney on December 17, 2012aut.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
8 Autism 0(0)
Second-order FB task. A second-order FB story was derived from Sullivan et al. (1994). A series of 
probe and control questions were asked to ensure that the child was following the story. After each 
probe or control question was answered, feedback or correction was provided to the child. Finally, 
the second-order FB question was asked, and the child was prompted to justify his or her response.
Procedure
Children were tested individually in a quiet part of their school, during a 20-min session. The 
WISC-III was administered in a separate session, within 2 weeks before or after the CF-emotion 
stories. All sessions were audio taped and transcribed later. The counterfactual stories were pre-
sented in counterbalanced order. The transcriptions were scored by two independent coders (gradu-
ate students).
Scoring
CF-emotion tasks. Transcriptions were scored by two independent coders. Children who correctly 
judged that the protagonist who nearly attained a better or worse outcome would feel worse or bet-
ter than the other protagonist, respectively, were awarded one point. When children judged that 
both protagonists would feel the same, or that the nontarget protagonist would feel better/worse, 
they received no points. Children who named the target protagonist and provided an explanation in 
which it was clear that they had thought about an alternative situation (i.e. what would have hap-
pened if the protagonist had not made an active decision or change in routine) were awarded an 
additional point. Thus, children received a score from 4 (based on two stories) for each type of 
CF-emotion. Interrater reliability was satisfactory (Kendall’s τ ranging from .67 to .92). All disa-
greements were resolved by discussion.
Second-order FB task. Children were scored as passing the second-order FB task when they showed 
second-order reasoning, which included a response that acknowledged the understanding of the 
embedded thoughts of one protagonist on the thoughts of another protagonist, including an appro-
priate justification according to the taxonomy of Sullivan et al. (1994). Interrater reliability 
(Cohen’s Kappa) was .99 for the second-order FB task.
Results
Results are presented in three sections. First, children’s performance on the different story types 
and relations between stories are presented. Second, multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
was used to test for age and group differences in understanding CF-emotion and to examine the 
influence of direction and agency. Finally, relations between second-order FB understanding and 
CF-emotion were explored.
Mean scores for each story type (disappointment, contentment, regret, or relief) are presented in 
Table 3 and suggest that comparison of children performed better than their HFASD counterparts 
across all story types, although this difference was more marked for downward counterfactual 
stories (i.e. contentment and relief). Furthermore, children appeared to find the upward counterfac-
tual stories (i.e. disappointment and regret) more difficult than the downward stories but, within 
each direction (i.e. upward and downward), they were better at making simple emotion attributions 
than second-order emotion attributions. Correlations between story types, controlling for age and 
full-scale IQ, revealed very different patterns for comparison and HFASD children (Table 4). For 
comparison children, there were robust positive associations between the upward stories (i.e. 
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between disappointment and regret) and between downward stories (i.e. between contentment and 
relief), but not across the direction of the stories (i.e. no associations were found between disap-
pointment and relief, or between contentment and regret). This speaks strongly to the conceptual 
grouping by direction. Also, the second-order emotion stories (i.e. regret and relief) were robustly 
positively correlated. By contrast, performance on all story types was similarly positively corre-
lated for HFASD children, perhaps suggesting a more uniform approach to understand CF-emotions 
in the HFASD sample.
A 3 × 2 × 2 × 2 (age (6–8, 8–10, 10–12) × group (comparison, HFASD) × 2 direction (upward, 
downward) × 2 agency (simple, second order)) MANOVA showed main effects of the between-
subject factors: age, F(2, 136) = 29.03, p < .001, partial η2 = .30, and group, F(1, 136) = 10.59, p < .01, 
partial η2 = .07. These results confirmed that older children were better able to understand 
CF-emotions, but that HFASD children performed less well than typically developing children. 
There were also main effects for the within-subjects factors direction, F(1, 136) = 93.03, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .06, and agency, F(1, 136) = 49.88, p < .001, partial η2 = .27, showing more adequate 
responses in the downward stories than the upward stories, and for the simple emotion stories than 
the second-order emotion stories. These main effects were, however, qualified by significant inter-
actions between group and direction, F(1, 136) = 8.52, p < .01, partial η2 = .06, and between age and 
agency, F(1, 136) = 4.11, p < .05, partial η2 = .06. For the group × direction interaction, post hoc 
univariate ANOVAs showed that compared to the typically developing comparison group, the 
HFASD participants scored more poorly on the downward (contentment, F(1, 136) = 7.29, p < .01, 
partial η2 = .05, and relief, F(1, 136) = 9.72, p < .01, partial η2 = .07) but not the upward counterfactual 
stories. The age × agency interaction stemmed from a relative increase in the understanding of 
simple CF-emotions between the middle (8–10 years) and oldest (10–12 years) groups, whereas 
understanding second-order CF-emotions did not differ between these age groups, F(1, 95) = 7.41, p 
< .01, partial η2 = .07. Follow-up analyses were conducted to examine whether controlling for IQ, 
Table 3. Mean (SD) scores for counterfactually based emotion responses (0–4)
Disappointment Contentment Regret Relief
Comparison 1.55 (1.51) 3.06 (1.39) 1.28 (1.15) 2.18 (1.46)
HFASD 1.28 (1.24) 2.35 (1.70) 1.13 (1.19) 1.45 (1.34)
HFASD: high-functioning autism spectrum disorders; SD: standard deviation.
Table 4. Correlations between different types of CF-emotion stories and second-order FB 
understanding, controlling for age and full-scale IQ
Contentment Regret Relief Second-order FB
Comparison Disappointment NS .56** NS NS
 Contentment NS .35** .29*
 Regret .39** .26*
 Relief .31*
HFASD Disappointment .33** .47** .46** NS
 Contentment .43** .48** NS
 Regret .42** NS
 Relief NS
IQ: intelligence quotient; NS: not significant; FB: false belief.
*p < .05, ** p < .01.
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or only analyzing participant’s correct choices of protagonists, disregarding their ability to explain 
their response (which may be related to verbal skills), yielded the same main and interaction 
effects. The overall pattern of findings was unchanged.
Children generally performed well on the second-order FB task, as would be expected among 
these older ages. Despite the fact that comparison and HFASD children did not differ on age or IQ, 
HFASD children did perform more poorly on the second-order FB task (M = .54, standard devia-
tion (SD) = .50) than comparison children (M = .74, SD = .44), F(1, 139) = 6.59, p < .05, partial η2 = 
.05. Table 4 shows relations between CF-emotion and second-order FB understanding, controlling 
for age and full-scale IQ. For comparison children, there were modest positive associations between 
CF-emotions and second-order FB, with the exception of disappointment. By contrast, in the 
HFASD group, second-order FB reasoning was not related to understanding CF-emotions.
Finally, as a follow-up analysis, relations between full-scale IQ and CF-emotions were exam-
ined, controlling for age. In the HFASD group, full-scale IQ was positively correlated with all 
types of CF-emotions (disappointment, r = .30, p < .05; regret: r = .37, p < .01; contentment, r = 
.24, p < .05; relief: r = .24, p < .05). In contrast, IQ was not correlated with any of the CF-emotions 
in the typically developing comparison group.
Discussion
While many studies have highlighted the understanding of both basic and complex emotions in 
children with HFASD (Begeer et al., 2008), this study is the first investigation of understanding 
CF-emotions in children with HFASD. Results indicated that the ability to explain emotions based 
on counterfactual reasoning improved with age, and all children generally found simple emotions 
(i.e. disappointment and contentment) easier to explain than second-order emotions (i.e. regret and 
relief). Furthermore, children with HFASD achieved lower overall scores than typically develop-
ing children. Importantly, these findings showed that children with HFASD were not specifically 
impaired in understanding second-order emotions based on counterfactual reasoning, as was pre-
dicted, despite the finding that they were performing more poorly on the second-order FB task. 
Rather, the lower scores for children with HFASD were moderated by direction, such that there 
were specific deficits in their understanding of downward emotions (i.e. contentment and relief) 
relative to typically developing comparison children. This confirmed the prediction that children 
with HFASD would have difficulty reasoning from counterfactual alternatives when the outcome 
was positive (i.e. comparing the outcome to a more negative situations).
In the typically developing children, it is likely that direction is a salient differentiating feature 
within the stories. Thus, typically developing children performed best on the downward stories 
when compared to the upward stories and when compared to the performance of children with 
HFASD (Table 3). Furthermore, regarding relations between simple and second-order CF-emotion, 
there were robust positive associations within the upward domain and within the downward domain, 
but not between domains for the typical children. In stark contrast, children with HFASD were not 
sensitive to the directional specificity of the domains; relations within equally valenced domains 
were no more likely than relations between these domains (see Table 4). Taken together, these find-
ings suggest that typically developing children are far more sensitive to the direction of the com-
parison between the outcome and the counterfactual possibility than their HFASD counterparts, 
who seem to rely on a more general principle of counterfactual reasoning that is applied relatively 
independently of situational constraints (Begeer et al., 2010).
In the “Introduction,” it was argued that the nuanced functional features of downward 
CF-emotions may be less compelling for children with HFASD because the motivation to imagine 
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alternative negative outcomes in the context of a positive real outcome does not serve an obvious 
pragmatic function. In contrast, the tendency in both children and adults to think counterfactually 
when outcomes are negative has a clear preparative function (Beck and Crilly, 2009; Roese, 1997; 
Weisberg and Beck, 2010; White and Lehman, 2005) that is likely to be perceived by children with 
HFASD because of the obvious benefits of avoiding future negative situations. Our findings largely 
support this interpretation; the features of the downward stories were acknowledged more fre-
quently by typically developing children than children with HFASD.
Downward counterfactual reasoning generally induces adding alternative negative events that 
did not occur (“I’m so lucky that I wasn’t in that car accident”) and may be only indirectly related 
to the current situation. This type of reasoning also implies the possibility of proactively regulating 
one’s emotions, which may be problematic to children with HFASD (Begeer et al., 2007; Losh and 
Capps, 2006). However, in order to engage in upward counterfactual reasoning about an undesir-
able outcome, it may suffice to simply imagine that the negative outcome did not occur, subtracting 
it from reality (“If only there was no traffic jam!”). Previous findings in children with HFASD have 
indicated specific limitations in their ability to use additive counterfactuals, that is, to add informa-
tion to a given outcome, rather than to subtract information (Begeer et al., 2008), which allows one 
to “think within the box,” narrowing one’s responses down to explicitly provided information (for 
further discussion, see also Begeer et al., 2007). An individual can subtract elements of a given 
situation that are already made explicit. This strategy does not require one to initiate new alterna-
tives to reality and may come more naturally to children with HFASD (see also Kray et al., 2006).
While typically developing children were clearly sensitive to the direction of counterfactual 
comparisons, they were also influenced by the second-order nature of the stories; there were sig-
nificant positive associations among second-order CF-emotion stories (i.e. regret and relief), and 
between these stories and the second-order FB task, a finding that is consistent with the existing 
literature (Perner et al., 2004; Riggs et al., 1998). In the HFASD group, regret and relief stories 
were correlated, as were all the stories, but they were not significantly associated with the second-
order FB task. By contrast, for children with HFASD, all story types were associated with their IQ 
scores, while associations with IQ were wholly absent in the comparison group. These distinctive 
patterns of relations suggest that the ability to reflect on emotions in children with HFASD is likely 
mediated by general cognitive skills rather than specific mind-reading abilities. They may “work 
their way around” to get to the adequate response, deducing their explanation without relying on a 
full-blown understanding of other’s mental states. The use of cognitive skills to deal with affective 
situations was first described by Hermelin and O’Connor (1985) as the “logico-affective state” (see 
also Begeer et al., 2011 and Peterson et al., 2005). Typically developing children, on the other 
hand, likely generalize their specific mental state understanding when reflecting on complex coun-
terfactual determinants of emotions (see also Rieffe et al., 2007).
Strengths of the current study included a carefully matched sample of children with HFASD, 
and the simultaneous utilization of tasks that tapped two dimensions of counterfactual reasoning 
about emotion (i.e. direction and agency). Nevertheless, despite matching on age and full-scale IQ, 
children with HFASD did perform more poorly on the second-order FB task than their typically 
developing counterparts, and this may have accounted for the differential relations observed in 
Table 4. We think this possibility is unlikely however, because 54% of children with HFASD did 
pass the second-order FB task, which would indicate ample variation to reveal relations with 
CF-emotion understanding. The more likely interpretation is that for HFASD children, general IQ 
to some extent underpins both mental state understanding skills (second-order Theory of Mind and 
CF-emotion) but for typically developing children there is a greater differentiation between general 
cognitive capacity and mentalistic understanding of persons.
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It is also important to note that despite our efforts to tap two dimensions of counterfactual rea-
soning about emotion and to base our stories on the existing literature, there are of course other 
kinds of counterfactual reasoning about emotion that deserve attention, in particular, downward 
reasoning in the case of negative outcomes (i.e. “things could have been even worse”), such as has 
been explored by Guttentag and Ferrell (2008), and children’s spontaneous use of such reasoning. 
It is also noteworthy that the chosen stories were designed with the pragmatic aim of facilitating 
counterfactually based interpretations in children, they were not designed to minimize, for exam-
ple, inter-story variation. Therefore, it is important to stress that whereas group-based comparisons 
are relatively straightforward, comparisons based on story type need to be interpreted more 
cautiously.
Finally, although we were able to test a large sample of children with HFASD, who were diag-
nosed based on extensive procedures following DSM-IV-TR criteria, we did not have access to the 
standardized diagnostic measures to confirm their diagnoses. Moreover, the absence of measures 
on executive function skills did not allow for us to focus on important additional factors in the 
understanding of regret and relief, such as working memory and inhibition (Drayton et al., 2011). 
In future studies, it will be important to delineate how the understanding of regret and relief may 
be related to real-life experiences and behavior in children with HFASD. Although children with 
HFASD have often been shown to have adequate conceptual understanding of emotions, the social 
cognitive understanding tasks used to asses these abilities often overestimates their actual level of 
functioning in real-life situations (Begeer et al., 2008). Following the recent studies in typically 
developing children (Weisberg and Beck, 2010), highlighting the link between understanding, 
experience, and behavior would be a next step in this line of research.
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Appendix 1
Example relief story and questions
Bill and Pete are going on a school trip. They are allowed to choose between going on a sports day 
in the playing fields or to a kids’ museum. Bill wants to go to the museum. Pete chooses the sports 
day. When the teacher asks them what they chose, Bill says he wants to go to the museum. Pete 
changes his mind and also says he wants to go to the museum. On the day of the trip, it is pouring 
with rain. Children who chose to go to the sports day in the playing fields have to stay at school.
Questions: Who is happier about choosing the museum, Bill, who chose the museum right away, 
or Pete, who changed his mind, or do you think they are both equally happy? Why?
Example regret story and questions
Miriam and Susan go to the same school. Miriam usually takes the bus. Susan usually goes on her 
bike. Today, Susan decides to take the bus. Both Susan and Miriam are waiting at the bus stop but 
the bus does not come, and they have to wait a long time for the next bus. They both arrive at 
school very late.
Questions: Who is more annoyed with being late for school, Miriam, who usually takes the bus, 
or Susan, who usually goes by bike, or do you think they are both equally annoyed? Why?
Example disappointment story and questions
Both Tess and Rosie love to read. They often visit the library to borrow books. Tess has been wait-
ing for one of her favorite books on cats, which has been on loan for a long time. Rosie has also 
been waiting on one of her favorite books on ghosts, but that is also on loan. That afternoon Tess 
and Rosie visit the library again. Rosie immediately sees that her favorite ghost book has not been 
returned yet. Tess goes to the animal book section and sees that somebody else is just taking her 
favorite cat book and walking away.
Questions: Who is more disappointed about not being able to loan their book, Rosie, who imme-
diately saw that the ghost book was not there, or Tess, who saw someone else just take the cat 
book, or do they both feel the same? Why?
 at University of Sydney on December 17, 2012aut.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Begeer et al. 15
Example expectation story and questions
Joe and Phil are participating in a sprint competition. Joe has already won a gold medal twice. Phil 
has never won a medal. This time, Joe and Phil finish in exactly the same time, directly behind 
another boy who won the race. They both are in the second place, and they both get a silver medal.
Questions: Who is happier with his medal, Joe, who has won gold medals before, or Phil, who 
has never won a medal before, or do you think both of them are equally happy? Why?
(The original Dutch versions of the stories may be obtained from the first author (S.B.).)
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